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Abstract
We investigate partial insurance and group risk sharing in extended family networks. Our
approach is based on decomposing income shocks into group aggregate and idiosyncratic com-
ponents, allowing us to measure the extent to which each component is insured. We apply our
framework to extended family networks in the United States by exploiting the unique intergen-
erational structure of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find that over 60% of shocks to
household income are potentially insurable within extended family networks. However, we find
little evidence that the extended family provides insurance for such idiosyncratic shocks.
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Much research has been devoted to the intertemporal allocation of resources by households. The
ability of individuals and households to absorb income and resource shocks has substantial implica-
tions for their welfare, and limits to this ability could constitute an important motivation for policy
interventions. How much smoothing a household can achieve depends crucially on the instruments
at their disposal and the markets they have access to. With complete markets, households have
access to a full set of state-contingent assets that allow them to completely diversify idiosyncratic
risk; at the other extreme of self-insurance, households can only save and borrow through a simple
asset, which limits their smoothing capabilities such that certain income shocks are reflected into
consumption changes. In reality, households participate in a variety of markets, have access to
many sources of income and transfers, and interact with other households both formally and infor-
mally. However, they also face a number of barriers, such as incomplete information about shocks
or imperfect enforceability of contracts, which prevent full risk sharing. It is thus unsurprising
that most empirical tests soundly reject complete markets and also find smoothing beyond what is
feasible through self-insurance.1
The absence of complete markets does not preclude the existence of partial insurance among
groups of households that may be in a position to alleviate frictions that prevent full insurance. The
extent to which such groups provide insurance is an interesting question both because it documents
the importance of a potential source of risk sharing and because it could point to the relevance of
certain frictions. In this paper, we develop an empirical framework of partial insurance that builds
risk sharing within small groups into a model of self insurance, and apply it to extended families
in the United States. In particular, we seek to understand (a) the potential amount of insurance
that the extended family can offer, and (b) the extent to which this insurance actually takes place.
We focus on the extended family because some of the barriers that prevent full insurance, such
as information and enforceability problems, may be less relevant among households that are more
tightly connected. We take into account that extended families are small and less diversified than
the overall economy, which may limit the scope for insurance among its members. Ultimately,
comparing the smoothing provided within the extended family against the smoothing within the
1For example, see Attanasio and Davis (1996) for the rejection of complete markets, and Campbell and Deaton
(1989) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) for excess smoothness.
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economy at large can be informative about the mechanisms underlying the overall amount of
consumption smoothing observed in the data.
Our framework is based on a joint model of the stochastic process of income and the corre-
sponding behavior of consumption for an extended family group. Income evolves as a permanent-
transitory process, as in previous studies (see MaCurdy (1983), Abowd and Card (1989), Meghir
and Pistaferri (2004) and Attanasio and Borella (2014)). However, we extend this structure to
distinguish between family-aggregate and purely idiosyncratic components of income. This distinc-
tion is meaningful for risk sharing, because the group can insure components of shocks that are
idiosyncratic to its individual members but is not able to do so for components that are aggregate
for the group, thus affecting all members.
As in Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) we approximate consumption growth with a
linear function of income shocks,2 and we extend this relationship to allow for the distinction
between idiosyncratic and group-aggregate income components. By considering the difference be-
tween uninsurable “family-aggregate” and potentially insurable idiosyncratic shocks, we can detect
and quantify the amount of extended family insurance that takes place by estimating the extent to
which each of these shocks are passed through to consumption. We can also distinguish extended
families risk sharing from self-insurance and insurance from other outside sources.
To estimate our model and quantify the extent of insurance in extended-family networks, we
require longitudinal data on income and consumption, as well as familial links between households.
The main United States data that contains (most of) this information is the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), which has the unique feature of following the households of children of originally
sampled households once they have split away from their families. In addition, it contains detailed
income data, food consumption, and since 1999 much richer consumption information. We use the
1979-2011 waves, exploiting the long time series structure and observing extended families over a
long period of time. So as to be able to use a more comprehensive consumption measure dating
back before 1999, we follow Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) by using consumption imputed
from the 1980-2008 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
We document three main empirical findings. First, our decomposition shows that over 60% of
income shocks are potentially insurable by extended-family risk sharing networks. Thus, although
2See Hall (1988), Hall and Mishkin (1982), and Blundell and Preston (1998), amongst others.
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they are small in number compared to other natural groupings of households (e.g., coworkers,
religious groups, or neighborhoods), extended families have a sizable potential to share risk among
its households. Second, despite this potential, we find no evidence of any insurance within the
family network. Why this is the case is harder to establish. It may well be that the institutional
framework of public welfare programs and other sources of insurance is viewed as providing adequate
insurance, or it may be that frictions, either in the form of stigma, transaction costs, or imperfect
information and moral hazard, may hamper the ability of extended families to share risk. Our third
set of findings investigates this further by exploring the possibility that the family responds more
in settings in which shocks are easier to observe, including when households live near one another
or when shocks are particularly large. We find that no evidence of the latter, but some suggestive
evidence that extended families whose households live near one another provide some – though not
full – insurance, possibly because they are better able to solve information problems.
An earlier literature also focused specifically on risk sharing within the extended family in
the United States. In a series of papers, Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992) and Hayashi,
Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996), consider whether extended families can be viewed as collective units
sharing resources and risk efficiently and reject this hypothesis.3 Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff
(1996) conclude that “Future research should be directed to estimating the extent of consumption
insurance over and above self-insurance” (p. 288). We follow up on this suggestion and extend
this work in a number of ways. By estimating separate household and extended family income
processes, we are able to understand better the relative importance of extended family versus
(idiosyncratic) household level shocks and therefore the extent to which extended family insurance
is feasible. Moreover, we go beyond testing (and rejecting) full risk-sharing by (a) detecting and
quantifying the amount of extended family insurance that takes place and (b) distinguishing it
from self-insurance and insurance from other outside sources. Finally, we exploit broader measures
of consumption than did the earlier papers, which relied exclusively on food consumption.
Our main finding of no extended family insurance is perhaps surprising in light of related work
in the United States as well as developing country contexts. In the United States, for example,
parents offer coresidence to their adult children as insurance against labor market risk (Rosenzweig
and Wolpin, 1993; Kaplan, 2012) and save in a precautionary manner in response to the occupations
3Choi, McGarry, and Schoeni (2016) update these results using more recent data, and come to a similar conclusion.
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of their children (Boar, 2018). In other parts of the world, extended family networks are often found
to provide an important – yet incomplete – insurance role (e.g., Angelucci, De Giorgi, and Rasul
(2017) in Mexico and Fafchamps and Lund (2003) in the Philippines), though not always: Kinnan
and Townsend (2012), for example, find that kinship networks facilitate investment financing but
not consumption smoothing.4 While we cannot pin down a definitive reason for our contrasting
results, it may be the case that commitment issues or information frictions are more severe in the
US, perhaps because the relatively easy option to move offers more outside options (Morten, 2017) or
because extended families are more geographically dispersed and/or can rely on other mechanisms
for insurance, such as public insurance programs that can crowd out private arrangements. Thus,
our findings have implications for the modeling of extended families and are an important step
towards the identification of the relevant frictions that prevent risk sharing beyond what exists
across families.
More generally, our framework and empirical findings contribute to the broader literature on
risk sharing and partial insurance. On the theory side, an important literature has developed that
formally derives the conditions under which partial insurance can occur. Several models have been
developed that characterize constrained efficient equilibria, where the constraints arise from several
sources, such as the imperfect enforceability of contracts (such as in Thomas and Worrall (1988),
Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002), Kocherlakota (1996)) or imperfect information and moral
hazard (such as Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2007) and, more
recently, Karaivanov and Townsend (2014)). Dubois, Jullien, and Magnac (2008) also consider how
insurance possibilities vary with the presence of formal contracting, showing that they effectively
expand the set of incentive compatible allocations by acting as collateral. An important step in
this research agenda is to relate the amount of risk sharing and the deviations from perfect risk
sharing observed in the data to the implications of specific models of frictions. Attanasio and
Pavoni (2011), for instance, map the parameters that measure how much of income shocks are
reflected into consumption changes to the severity of a moral hazard friction. Our paper explores
an alternative context where many of these frictions could be mitigated and through which partial
4A parallel literature on the economic arrangements within nuclear families typically finds that spouses can sustain
some – but again, not full – insurance (see Chiappori (1988) and follow-up work in the United States and Thomas
(1990) for an example in a developing country context). This paper complements this literature in that it examines
a broader notion of families (the extended family) and finds that models of nuclear families do not describe well the
behavior of extended families.
5
insurance can arise, namely the extended family.
The paper proceeds in Section 2 with a discussion of alternative approaches using data on direct
transfers. Section 3 presents our model of partial insurance and Section 4 discusses identification
using covariance moments. We describe the PSID and CEX data and general method of moments
estimation procedure in Section 5, and Section 6 reports our main results. Section 7 provides several
robustness checks, including various subsample analyses and modeling extensions, and Section 8
concludes.
2 Evidence of extended family insurance using direct transfers
We begin our analysis by showing patterns of direct transfers between households of various re-
lationships, including parents, children, siblings, other relatives, and non-relatives. The tests we
propose in the next section do not use direct information on transfers and focus, instead, on the
relationship between the distribution of consumption and income. Nevertheless, information on
direct transfers is useful to assess the importance of these informal mechanisms for risk sharing.
Beyond showing that transfers are most commonly exchanged between extended family members,
we view the extended family as a natural grouping with which to share risk because of the presence
of altruism, the frequency of contact and the relative proximity between family members.5 Of
course, other relationships (such as friends) could exhibit some of these features, but the combina-
tion of these characteristics and the patterns in the transfer data suggest that risk-sharing among
extended family members may be first-order.
Indeed, we are not the first to investigate the insurance relationship between extended family
members. One strand of literature models specific in-kind transfers, such as those of goods, hous-
ing (i.e. shared residence) or time help. Kaplan (2012) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), for
instance, model the decision of adult children to co-reside with their parents as insurance against
income risk, and find it to be an important source of insurance. Transfers of time in the form of
babysitting or caregiving may also be an important source of insurance: Blau and Currie (2006), for
5For instance, during our sample period, two-thirds of adult children spoke on the phone with their mother at
least once a week, and three-fourths live within 100 miles of their father among those who do not already reside in
the same household (from the 1986 General Social Survey and 1988 PSID). In addition, in the early 1970s, 45% of
PSID respondents reported that a relative lived within walking distance, and today the median American lives only
18 miles from their mother (from the 1968-1972 PSID and the 2008 HRS).
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example, find that three-fourths of child care provided to working mothers by relatives is unpaid.
Another literature looks directly at cash transfers. Edwards (2015) finds that an unemployment
spell increases the likelihood of receiving a cash transfer from a family member in the PSID. Mc-
Garry (2016) uses 17 years of data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine the dynamic
aspects of transfer behavior from parents to children. She finds that around 12-15% of children
receive a transfer greater than $500 from their parents in any given year, and that the probability
of receiving a transfer correlates strongly with changes in a child’s income.
We can perform an analysis similar to that in McGarry (2016) using our sample from the PSID
(see Section 5.1 for a description of the main data and sample selection). In 1988 and 2013, the
PSID collected supplementary data on monetary and time transfers between parents and their
children. Using transfer data from 2013, Table 1 presents annual monetary and time transfers
given from parents to children in the top panel and the transfers received from children in bottom
panel. From the top panel, we see that 37 percent of adult children received transfers in the form
of time (around 270 hours a year, on average) and 32 percent received monetary transfers (around
$3400 a year on average) in the previous year. In the other direction, only 20 percent of parents
received time transfers (around 170 hours a year) and 7 percent receive money transfers ($380 a
year).
Table 2 presents a similar analysis using supplementary data from 1988 with an expanded
universe of transfer recipients (parents, children, siblings, other relatives, and non-relatives) and
again finds that most transfers are between parents and children, which underlies our motivation
to consider the extended family as a possible insurance network.
Additionally, we are able to link the 1988 transfer data to income changes between 1987 and
1988. As described in more detail in Section 3.1, we isolate unexplained income, defined as the
residual in a regression of log (pre-transfer) income on a set of demographics, to capture unexpected
income changes. In Table 3, we run probit regressions of the probability of receiving a transfer on
the quartile of a household’s unexplained income change from 1987 to 1988. By splitting the sample
into quartiles of the income “shock” distribution, we get a rough sense for whether households that
receive the most negative income shocks (those in the first quartile) are more likely to receive
transfers from family and friends relative to those who receive the most positive income shocks
(those in the fourth quartile). Panel A reports marginal effects on the probability of receiving a
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Table 1: Parent-child transfers (2013 PSID)
Any amount Mean 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
(%) (conditional) (conditional) (conditional) (conditional)
Transfers to children
Hours 0.368 272 20 60 240
Money 0.321 3390 500 1100 3500
Transfers from children
Hours 0.204 168 15 50 208
Money 0.068 382 100 300 500
Note: The sample includes extended families in the 2013 PSID, where we define extended families as a cohabiting
couple under 65 and their adult children over 25. The data come from parent reports of transfers in 2012. “Transfers
Given” refer to transfers given from parents to children, and “Transfers Received” refer to transferred received by
parents from children. Only monetary transfers over $100 are ascertained. Column (1) reports the percent of
parent households reporting non-zero amounts of time or money, and columns (2)-(5) report amounts of time or
money, conditional on a non-zero amount. Column (2) reports the conditional mean, and columns (3)-(5) report the
conditional 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of the conditional distribution.
monetary transfer. From column 1, we see that households in the bottom quartile of income shocks
are 6 percent more likely to receive a transfer than households in the top quartile of income shocks,
suggesting that transfers may play an insurance role. The subsequent columns present estimates
for different subsamples and suggest that most of this effect is driven by transfers from parents to
children. Panel B repeats this analysis for time transfers and shows that time transfers are not
significantly correlated with unexplained income changes.
The simple correlations presented in this section, therefore, suggest that: (1) parents and adult
children may be the appropriate risk sharing network, (2) monetary transfers from parents to
children are associated with income changes and (3) time transfers do not appear to be related to
income changes. One limitation of these results, however, is that they do not take into account the
circumstances of the potential provider of transfers. For instance, one would expect the transfer
behavior of a potential donor who themselves had a large negative shock to be very different from
the transfer behavior of a potential donor who received a large positive shock. In addition, these
transfer results, which ignore the variation in consumption and its relation to income shocks, do
not capture the degree to which households are insured against such shocks, both because the
magnitudes of the effects in Table 3 are not interpretable in a risk sharing framework and because
it is unclear how these transfers interact with other sources of insurance available to households.
In the next section, we discuss a model of partial insurance and extended family risk sharing that
explicitly takes these caveats into account and provides a structural interpretation for our results.
8
Table 2: Family and friends transfers (1988 PSID)
Children Parents
Any amount Amount Any amount Amount
(%) (conditional) (%) (conditional)
Transfers given (money)
Total money given 0.123 1547 (2003) 0.142 3224 (5796)
To parents 0.021 780 (1217) 0.036 2416 (6816)
To children 0.049 2642 (2128) 0.090 3847 (5795)
To siblings 0.027 477 (406) 0.006 750 (354)
To other relatives 0.010 464 (386) 0.009 1767 (1935)
To non-relatives 0.021 545 (819) 0.006 158 (81)
Transfers received (money)
Total money received 0.291 2231 (6796) 0.054 6947 (23350)
From parents 0.264 1913 (6236) 0.042 1554 (2749)
From children 0.000 NA (NA) 0.006 645 (502)
From siblings 0.016 2150 (4633) 0.003 2000 (NA)
From other relatives 0.019 5048 (12605) 0.000 NA (NA)
From non-relatives 0.019 831 (922) 0.000 NA (NA)
Transfers given (time)
Total hours given 0.397 337 (670) 0.380 501 (929)
To parents 0.332 301 (659) 0.238 418 (864)
To children 0.001 408 (NA) 0.127 520 (738)
To siblings 0.071 106 (134) 0.030 352 (661)
To other relatives 0.034 118 (125) 0.030 371 (791)
To non-relatives 0.078 266 (598) 0.039 77 (93)
Transfers received (time)
Total hours received 0.435 424 (721) 0.114 149 (230)
From parents 0.387 398 (687) 0.036 229 (389)
From children 0.000 NA (NA) 0.045 83 (55)
From siblings 0.073 237 (466) 0.012 104 (104)
From other relatives 0.013 75 (60) 0.009 183 (144)
From non-relatives 0.084 147 (196) 0.033 64 (55)
Note: The sample includes extended families in the 2013 PSID, where we define extended families as a cohabiting
couple under 65 and their adult children over 25. The data come from child (columns (1) and (2)) and parent
(columns (3) and (4)) reports of transfers in 1987. Only monetary transfers over $100 are ascertained. Columns
(1) and (3) report the percent of households reporting non-zero amounts of time or money, and columns (3) and
(4) report mean amounts of time or money, conditional on a non-zero amount. Total transfers include family and
non-family transfers. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Receipt of money and time transfers on income change quartile (1988 PSID)
Full sample Children Parents
Transfer from: Family & friends Family & friends Parents Non-parents Family & Friends
Panel A: Money transfers
Income change quartile
1 (negative) 0.062∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.018
(0.035) (0.048) (0.047) (0.024) (0.030)
2 0.024 0.031 0.036 0.008 -0.076∗
(0.038) (0.048) (0.048) (0.022) (0.042)
3 -0.021 -0.021 -0.014 -0.000 -0.017
(0.035) (0.049) (0.048) (0.024) (0.030)
4 (positive) - omitted
N 1033 701 701 701 332
Panel B: Time transfers
Income change quartile
1 (negative) 0.006 0.041 0.029 0.046 -0.056
(0.043) (0.057) (0.055) (0.037) (0.047)
2 -0.031 -0.067 -0.067 0.021 -0.036
(0.044) (0.055) (0.054) (0.038) (0.051)
3 -0.043 -0.050 -0.044 -0.007 -0.030
(0.042) (0.053) (0.053) (0.037) (0.046)
4 (positive) - omitted
N 1033 701 701 701 332
Note: The table reports marginal effects coefficients from a probit regression of transfer receipt on income change
quartile (highest quartile omitted). The sample includes extended families in the 1988 PSID, where we define extended
families as a cohabiting couple under 65 and their adult children over 25. The data on transfers received come from all
(column (1)), child (columns (2)-(4)) and parent (columns (5)) reports of transfers in 1987. Only monetary transfers
over $100 are ascertained. Income is defined as the residual of a regression of log (post tax and public transfer)
income on a set of demographics (see Section 3.1 for the full set of demographic controls), and income change is the
difference between residuals in 1987 and 1986. Standard errors clustered by extended family are in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3 Risk sharing: A theoretical framework
In this section, we specify a model in which households choose consumption to maximize an in-
tertemporal utility function given an exogenous income process and a budget constraint that reflects
the insurance possibilities they have access to. Households are seen as part of a group, such as the
extended family, and the income processes will be written to reflect this. That is, we decompose
the household income process into a group component and a purely idiosyncratic one. This decom-
position is useful as we want to consider explicitly the risk sharing possibility within the group.
One could additionally decompose household income into additional components (say, an economy
wide component, a sector component and so on). These decompositions would matter to the extent
we want to consider insurance possibilities within those other groups.
We consider different market environments, ranging from complete markets with economy-wide
perfect risk sharing, to an environment where households can perfectly share risk within a smaller
group such as the extended family, to one where they only have access to ‘self-insurance’ in the
form of individual savings (and possibly borrowing). The consideration of these different cases
and some approximations of the consumption function allow us to consider intermediate cases in
which households are able to insure a fraction of idiosyncratic shocks. Throughout this section,
we assume that the only source of uncertainty is exogenous, post-tax and government transfer
household income and that preferences over consumption are separable from leisure. We also
abstract from labor supply decisions. While this is a simplification, we view insurance in our model
as that provided above and beyond insurance that is incorporated in income (e.g. added worker
effects, implicit worker-firm contracts, government transfers). Additionally, the time transfer results
in the previous section suggest that labor – at least in the form of direct transfers – does not play
a major extended family insurance role.6
6See Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) and Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2005) for models
of consumption insurance that incorporate household labor supply decisions. Endogenous labor supply may matter
in two ways: first, under nonseparability between consumption and leisure keeping the marginal utility constant may
require lower (higher) transfers of income both because of substitutability (complementarity) between consumption
and leisure and than in the separable case, because of added worker effects. Since such nonseparability would apply
only within the nuclear family this mainly relates to how much insurance can be achieved in autarky. Second, some
of the income variability that we attribute to unexpected shocks may be endogenous labor supply responses. This
may lead to the impression of the existence of more insurance than reality. While these are all interesting issues, they
are unlikely to affect much the quantification of insurance from the extended family network because they are likely
to act proportionately on the relevant parameters.
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3.1 Preferences and income processes
We begin by considering preferences and income processes. We assume that, at time t, each house-
hold values sequences of future consumption flows according to the expected utility they provide.
Utility, in turn, is given by an intertemporally separable utility function that depends on household
consumption at different points in time. We assume that the future is discounted geometrically
and that utility is a concave function with standard regularity conditions. Therefore, sequences






Notice that in addition to the standard restrictions used in the literature (such as that of intertem-
poral separability), we assume that utility for household i depends only on their consumption and
is not affected by the consumption of other households.
The household is entitled to streams of uncertain income that are seen as exogenous stochastic
processes Yi,t.7 Following earlier empirical results, we model household income as a permanent-
transitory process (MaCurdy (1983), Abowd and Card (1989) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)).
This is because it provides a good and parsimonious fit to the stochastic structure of income and
at the same time allows an important distinction between the ability to insure events that only
have a temporary effect on income relative to events that may have a much more persistent effect,
and hence a much larger impact on resources. The stochastic structure of income is made up of
three components: (1) a deterministic component which we model as a function of demographics
zi,t,8 (2) a permanent component Pi,t, and (3) a transitory component νi,t. In addition, measured
income is affected by a multiplicative measurement error myi,t.
log Yi,t = zi,tϕt + Pi,t + νi,t +myi,t
The permanent component follows a random walk in which the innovations, ui,t, are mean zero and
7We are therefore assuming that labor supply is exogenous. The assumption that labor supply is separable from
consumption and that wage effects are positive may underestimate the amount of insurance, but given that hours
elasticities are relatively small and we see no time transfers in response to income shocks in the previous section, we
do not expect a large bias.
8Specifically, in the estimation we control for year, age, education, race, family size, number of kids, region,
urbanicity, and interactions of year with education, race, region, and urbanicity.
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serially uncorrelated:
Pi,t = Pi,t−1 + ui,t
The transitory component follows an MA(q) process in which the innovations ei,t are also mean
zero and serially uncorrelated:




In the estimation section, we determine that the transitory component follows an MA(1) process
(θ1 = θ and θk = 0 for all k > 1), so we henceforth write it as such. If we define log yi,t ≡
log Yi,t− zi,tϕt, the growth in the deviation of log income from its deterministic component is given
by:
∆ log yi,t = ui,t + ∆(ei,t + θei,t−1) + ∆myi,t (1)
In the rest of this section, we use this equation as the starting point from which households share
risk.
3.2 Risk sharing arrangements
The second block of our conceptual framework is the definition of risk sharing groups. In this
subsection and the next, we analyse two different risk sharing set-ups: the entire economy as
a potential risk sharing group and a smaller group such as the extended family. Although the
allocations that would prevail under full risk sharing in the economy at large are first best (under
some assumptions), such allocations might not be attainable because of the presence of a number of
frictions, might those be informational frictions or enforceability problems. In such a situation, it
is interesting to consider smaller risk sharing arrangements, like the extended family, which might
be better equipped to deal with certain types of frictions.
The simplest way to describe the properties of full risk sharing within a groupG is to consider the
problem of a social planner that maximizes the weighted average of the group members’ utilities,
subject to an aggregate budget constraint.9 Our approach focuses on intertemporal allocations
within group G and it is completely agnostic about what happens across groups. Specifically, at
9For notational simplicity, we write the problem without aggregate savings. The conditions we would use would
not be different in the presence of aggregate savings.
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Yi,τ (sτ ) =
∑
i∈G
Ci,τ (sτ ) ∀ τ ≥ t (2)
in which λi is the weight given by the social planner to household i and st describes the state of the
economy, which evolves as a Markov process such that the probability of state sτ at time τ given
the current state s(t) at time t is Ps(τ)s(t) . Given that all income realization for all households are
fully contractible, the first order condition for consumption for each state of the world sτ at time
τ of household i is:
λiβU
′(Ci,τ ) = µ(sτ )/Ps(τ)s(t) (3)
where µ(sτ ) is the multiplier associated with the aggregate budget constraint and U ′(Ci,τ ) is the
marginal utility of consumption for household i. Notice that, as all states of the world are fully
contractible, marginal utility of consumption depends on the state of the world but not idiosyncratic
differences between households in the group. If we take the ratio of this equation at two different








= ν(τ, τ ′) (4)
Notice that in equation (4), the right-hand side does not depend on i, implying that the change
in the marginal utility of consumption is the same across all households in the sharing group.
Assuming power utility and a multiplicative measurement error in consumption, one can take the
log of equation (4) considered at two adjacent time periods and obtain:
∆ log(ci,t) = ψt + εi,t (5)
Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994) test such an equation by adding to it a realization of id-
iosyncratic income and testing the hypothesis that the coefficient on such a variable is zero. The
idea behind such a test is that under perfect risk sharing, household consumption adjusts in such
a way that changes in marginal utilities (approximated by the log-changes in consumption under
CRRA utility) is the same across households in the risk sharing group. Therefore, any shock to
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household income should not enter significantly in such an equation. The test is silent and agnostic
about the specific decentralization through which first best allocations are achieved or about the
specific assets and contracts (formal and informal) that households might be using. Furthermore,
under perfect risk sharing there is no distinction between (idiosyncratic) permanent and transitory
shocks.
At the other extreme, one can consider an economy where households in group G have no risk
sharing possibilities and they can only smooth income shocks using a single asset that pays an
interest Rt, which can be either constant or variable. This market structure – the “Bewley” model
– implies a very simple individual budget constraint. In such an environment, one is within the
realm of a standard life cycle model in which the distinction between (idiosyncratic) transitory and
permanent shocks matters: transitory shocks are almost fully smoothed out and permanent ones
are, instead, almost completely reflected in consumption.10
As is well known, a closed form solution that expresses consumption as a function of the state
variables to the problem (and innovations to the income process) can only be obtained under
special circumstances, such as quadratic utility and constant interest rates. However, a number of
contributions, including Blundell and Preston (1998) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)
use log-linear approximations to express innovations to consumption as a function of innovations
to income. That is, they derive an equation of the following form:
∆ log ci,t = δui,t + γ(1 + θ)ei,t + ∆mci,t + ξi,t (6)
where δ and γ measure the degree to which permanent and transitory shocks, respectively, pass
through to consumption. In addition, there may be preference shocks (ξi,t) and classical measure-
ment error (mci,t).
In a model such as Bewley’s, the values of δ and γ should be dictated solely by the ability to
smooth shocks through self-insurance. Under CRRA preferences, self-insurance is attained through
the potential to borrow from future income streams as well as precautionary savings. With an
infinite horizon, δ = 1 and γ = 0. With finite lives, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)
show that an approximation of the Euler equation yields δ ' πi,t and γ ' αi,tπi,t where πi,t is the
10The two ‘almost’ qualifiers in the previous sentence derive from the fact that the time horizon of the household
problem is finite. The closer a household is to T , the more ‘permanent’ are ‘transitory’ shocks.
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percentage of future income in current wealth (in other words, the percentage of lifetime wealth that
is tied up in future income) and αi,t is an annuitization factor. Equation (6) can also be empirically
evaluated to estimate the fraction of permanent and transitory idiosyncratic income shocks that are
transmitted to consumption in the data. The size of the coefficients can therefore be informative
of the market structure that is relevant in a given context. Using this model, work by Blundell,
Low, and Preston (2013) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) find that πi,t = 0.8 while
δ = 0.64. Under CRRA preferences, since self-insurance implies δ = πi,t, the empirical finding that
δ < πi,t can be interpreted as evidence of insurance above and beyond self-insurance. Next we turn
to a model of extended family risk sharing that may help provide an explanation for this additional
insurance.
3.3 Incorporating extended family risk sharing
We now consider explicitly risk sharing within a smaller group – specifically, the extended family – in
comparison to economy-wide risk sharing.11 The extended family might be particularly interesting
as a risk sharing institution because it may be able to deal more effectively with the frictions that
may underlie the failure of insurance in larger groups: (i) it might face less severe information
constraints in the sense that shocks to the various family members may be better observable (i.e.,
avoiding moral hazard issues), and (ii) it may be easier to enforce commitment, which is important
for implementing transfers. One can then relate the estimates of the ‘risk sharing’ parameters
in equation (6), where one considers overall risk sharing, with those that obtained by explicitly
considering the difference in risk sharing between extended family members and the whole economy.
To start, we can express the income process in equation (1) in terms of deviations of the
household idiosyncratic component from the extended family aggregate component. In particular,
we define uFj,t as the aggregate permanent shock to extended family resources for extended family
j, or the average of the shocks received by members of extended family j: uFj,t = 1nj
∑nj
i=1 ui,j,t. We
denote with uIi,j,t the idiosyncratic permanent shock to household i in extended family j, or the
deviation of the shock for household i from the family-aggregate shock uFj,t. We therefore decompose
ui,t as the sum of uFj,t and uIi,j,t. Analogously, we consider extended family aggregate temporary
11To be clear, by extended family we mean multiple households that share familial ties, not a nuclear family within
a single household.
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shocks eFj,t and the decomposition ei,t = eFj,t + eIi,j,t. Notice that, by definition, the sum of the









i,j,t = 0. Rewriting equation (1), the growth in log income is:
∆ log yi,j,t = uFj,t + uIi,j,t + ∆(eFj,t + θeFj,t−1) + ∆(eIi,j,t + θeIi,j,t−1) + ∆m
y
i,j,t. (7)
The interpretation of the aggregate components deserves attention at this point. If the overall
shocks are i.i.d. across households, and abstracting from economy wide aggregate shocks, the
aggregate-group shock should be zero for large groups; the fact that it may not be is a result
of the finite (and small) number of members of extended families. In this case, the variance of
the aggregate income shock is the variance of the household shocks divided by the number of
group members. In the relatively small extended family groups we consider, these variances can be
substantial. However, we do not take this statistical interpretation of the aggregate family shock
literally, because it may well be that the stochastic processes of related extended family members
are correlated as a result of common regional, occupational and educational environments for
example.12 In this case there is an additional component to the aggregate variance and the θ
coefficients may differ between aggregate and idiosyncratic transitory shocks. For now, we remain
agnostic about the origins of the family-aggregate shock and for parsimony we keep the restriction
of a common θ, but we explore this restriction further in Section 7. The estimation of the permanent
components, however, remain the same; it is only the interpretation that is modified.
The decomposition of income shocks into idiosyncratic and family-aggregate components allows
us to quantify the percentage of shocks that could be insured by the extended family, which ef-
fectively defines the risk sharing opportunity of the extended family. Idiosyncratic shocks are, by
definition, household-level deviations from the family-average shock, and hence the extended family
network can redistribute funds between households to smooth these shocks. On the other hand,
family-aggregate shocks, which arise from the fact that extended families are small and thus induce
small-sample correlation in shocks, cannot be smoothed by extended family networks. Therefore,
the pass-through of idiosyncratic income shocks to consumption may differ from the pass-through
12Indeed in the context of India, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) argue that parents marry their daughters to males




To study these differences in pass-through rates, we rewrite equation (6), the growth in log
consumption, as:
∆ log ci,j,t = δIuIi,j,t + δFuFj,t + γI(1 + θ)eIi,j,t + γF (1 + θ)eFj,t + ∆mci,j,t + ξi,j,t (8)
= δFui,j,t + (δI − δF )uIi,j,t + γF (1 + θ)ei,j,t + (γI − γF )(1 + θ)eIi,j,t + ∆mci,j,t + ξi,j,t
where δF measures the degree to which family-aggregate permanent shocks pass through to con-
sumption and δI measures the degree to which idiosyncratic permanent shocks pass through to
consumption. Similarly, γF and γI measure the sensitivity of consumption to transitory shocks
that are family-aggregate and idiosyncratic, respectively.13
Equation (8) identifies the portion of extended family aggregate and purely idiosyncratic per-
manent and temporary shocks that are reflected into changes to individual consumption. It nests
neatly the extreme cases of Bewley and perfect risk sharing models. For models with partial risk
sharing, it measures the fraction of each shock that is reflected in consumption and can be infor-
mative of the type of frictions that prevent full risk sharing. For these types of models, a structural
interpretation of the estimated coefficients can be difficult. For instance, in a model with imper-
fectly enforceable contracts, changes in consumption and the level of enforceable insurance will
depend in a non-linear fashion on the entire distribution of shocks in the insurance group, rather
than on the simple aggregate and individual decomposition used here. In some situations, such as
the one considered by Attanasio and Pavoni (2011), it is possible to relate the estimated parameter
to a structural parameter. In many other cases, such a mapping is not possible. Nevertheless, by
identifying and estimating all of the parameters of this equation, we can consider simultaneously
risk sharing within and across extended families.
It may be useful to recast our discussion of how the predictions of the two extreme models (the
Bewley model and the model of perfect risk sharing) manifest themselves in the insurance param-
eters of equation (8). We focus the discussion on the partial insurance parameters for permanent
13In this specification, we treat the income process of all members of the extended family symmetrically (later in
the paper we show that variances of the income process do not change with age). We also treat the transmission
parameters symmetrically across different extended family members, which would be a natural assumption if extended
families engage in risk sharing or if they have similar alternative sources of insurance. Note, however, that consumption
levels are not necessarily symmetric; instead, this model only assumes that changes in marginal utility are symmetric.
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shocks, δI and δF , as their permanence necessarily has larger welfare implications than transitory
shocks, but the logic follows for transitory shocks as well.
Bewley model. Under autarky, insurance parameters are dictated solely by the ability of house-
holds to smooth consumption through self-insurance using the income stream of their household.
In other words, the distinction between family-aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks is meaningless
and has no bearing on consumption: both get transmitted into consumption to the same extent.
It follows that, in this environment, δI = δF . In addition, as discussed above, partial insurance
coefficients are a function of assets and age as a result of precautionary savings and the ability to
borrow from future income.
Perfect extended family risk sharing. Under perfect extended family risk sharing, the distri-
bution of income between extended family members has no effect on the distribution of consumption
between extended family members (Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996)). Thus, controlling for
shocks to the extended family’s aggregate resources, a shock to a household should have no effect on
a household’s consumption. This restriction is equivalent to δI = 0 in our framework. In addition,
because the distribution of income does not determine the distribution of consumption, the shock
to aggregate resources should affect each household similarly (in terms of consumption growth).
In our framework, this additional restriction corresponds to δAF = δBF for any households A,B in
extended family j. Overall, perfect extended family risk sharing predicts that 0 = δI ≤ δF .
Partial extended family risk sharing. Although, under partial extended family risk sharing,
it may be difficult to give a structural interpretation of the estimated parameters, we expect 0 <
δI < δF . This would reflect an attenuation of the effect of insurable shocks, but less than complete
insurance. We can separately estimate these parameters, and their difference quantifies the amount
of insurance that the extended family offers over and above insurance offered by other channels,
including public programs and the broader network of friends. This is shown more explicitly in
the second line of equation (8), where the transmission of the idiosyncratic component of the shock
uIi,j,t is attenuated by δF − δI . Therefore, in what follows, we report our estimates of δF − δI and
interpret it as the fraction of idiosyncratic shocks that are insured through the extended family.
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4 Identification
The model presented above can be seen as a stochastic factor model consisting of two equations,
one for income growth and one for consumption growth. As is characteristic of factor models, each
equation depends on several unobserved factors, some of which are common across individuals in a
family and some of which are mutually independent.
To understand insurance within a group, it is useful to recover both the covariance structure of
the income factors (which determines the extent of uncertainty facing households and the extent to
which shocks are insurable within the extended family) as well as the coefficients associated with
these factors in the consumption growth equation because they reflect the amount of insurance that
occurs within and between extended families.
The specific set of parameters we wish to estimate are (a) the transmission parameters δI ,
δF , γI , and γF , (b) permanent income variances var(uFt ) and var(uIt ) and transitory income vari-
ances var(eFt ) and var(eIt ), (c) measurement error variances for consumption var(mc,t) and income
var(my), and (d) consumption preference shock variances var(ξ). We allow all variances to vary over
time except the consumption preference shock variance and the income measurement error vari-
ance.14 To identify parameters, we exploit covariance structures across both time and within-family
dimensions.
In addition to the factor structures of individual income and consumption growth in equations
(7) and (8), we define family-level (j) income and consumption growth below as the averages over
individuals (i) within an extended family:



























Using these four equations (i.e. equations defining ∆ log yi,j,t, ∆ log ci,j,t, ∆ log yj,t, and ∆ log cj,t),
we construct a matrix of the time series auto-covariances as well as cross-covariances between
income and consumption for each of the household-level and family-level equations. Each covariance
14We could easily extend this to identify time-varying consumption preference shock variances and income mea-
surement error variances, but since we do not allow them to vary over time in estimation (due to data concerns), we
do not demonstrate this here.
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consists of an observable component (i.e., the left-hand side of each of the four equations) and a
function of the parameters of interest (i.e., the right-hand side of each of the four equations).
The structure we use implies a number of natural restrictions as well as more substantive
assumptions on these covariances. At the heart of identification are two economic assumptions: (a)
no borrowing restrictions, i.e. individuals can borrow and lend based on one riskless asset such that
at the end of life they are left with no liability, and (b) the shocks to income are unanticipated, so
there is no foresight.15 In addition, as described in Section 3, we represent log (residual) income as
a random walk plus an MA(1) error. Had it been empirically warranted, more general structures
can be allowed (e.g., an MA(k) error). We also assume that all shocks and measurement errors
are independent of one another. A final set of restrictions follow from the definition of extended
family level shocks: by construction, family-level shocks and idiosyncratic shocks for each household
within the extended family are uncorrelated. Moreover, the idiosyncratic shocks of each household
within an extended family are correlated in a specific way implied by the fact that they must sum
to zero. These restrictions are completely innocuous as they follow from the definition.
With these covariances, we are able to identify each parameter of interest.16 Appendix A pro-
vides details of the exact covariance structures, but the basic identification argument is as follows.
As is the case in prior studies, first- and second-order time-series covariances identify parame-
ters related to transitory shocks and measurement error, while cross-sectional covariances identify
parameters related to permanent shocks and taste shocks. Building on this, family-level covari-
ances identify family-level parameters, while household-level covariances identify the remaining
household-level parameters. This is because of the feature that all idiosyncratic (household-level)









One particularly noteworthy feature of our model of risk-sharing is that it allows for identifi-
cation of the variance of measurement error in income. This is not possible in most models that
include both measurement error and transitory shocks because the variance of measurement error
15As discussed in Kaplan and Violante (2010), the approach taken by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), on
which we build, is valid under perfect risk sharing and in a Bewley economy. It also works exactly in some partial
risk sharing contexts and approximately well in others (Attanasio and Pavoni, 2011, for example). A violation of
these assumptions would lead to the orthogonality conditions we use to be violated. However, Blundell, Pistaferri,
and Preston (2008) show that at least the latter assumption of unanticipated shocks is not violated.
16Our model only requires the estimation of the covariance structure of consumption and income. As a result
we need no assumptions on higher order moments or indeed on the full distribution of the shocks, which can be
completely general, so long as the second order moments exist.
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enters one-for-one with the variance of the transitory shock. Our model, however, puts additional
structure on the transitory shock when we consider the role of the extended family. Intuitively,
each of var(eIt ), var(eFt ), and var(my) enter one-for-one in household-level covariances, but since∑nj
i=1 e
I
i,j,t = 0, family-level covariances do not contain var(eIt ), while var(eFt ) enters in full and
var(my) enters as an average (that is, multiplied by 1/nj) since family-level statistics are defined
as averages over households in the extended family. Thus, family-level covariances allow for the
separate identification of measurement error from transitory shocks.
5 Data and estimation
Our main data is the 1979-2011 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which
includes information on income, consumption, and demographics. We supplement this data with
imputed non-durable consumption estimated using the 1980-2010 Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX). Our method of imputation is identical to that of Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008).
5.1 PSID sample
We use the 1979-2011 PSID, a longitudinal study of US households that began in 1968 with a
sample of around 5,000 households.17 Each survey contains questions about income, expenditures,
and demographic and family information. In addition to the questions asked each survey wave,
the PSID collect more detailed information on various themes. For example, in Section 2 we use
supplementary data on time and monetary transfers between family and friends, which was collected
in 1988 and 2013. In every year following 1968, both these original households and households that
were formed after 1968 by children of the original households (“split-offs”) were followed yearly
until 1997 and then every other year thereafter. Because the PSID follows split-offs, we are able to
track and link parents and children of original households even after the children form their own
households. These parent-child linkages are the basis of our extended family risk sharing network
definition.
We define an “extended family” in our sample as a cohabiting couple and their adult children
17Of these, around 3,000 were representative of the US population (the core sample), and around 2,000 were low-
income households (the Census Bureau’s SEO sample). In addition, in 1997 around 500 immigrant households were
added in an effort to keep the sample representative of the US population.
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who have broken off from the parent household to form their own households. To be clear, by
“extended family” (or sometimes “family” – we use the terms interchangeably), we mean multiple
separate households that share familial ties, not a nuclear family within a single household. We
only include adult children who are at least 25 years old (to avoid large education changes) and
only once they have split from the original household unit.18 We then follow the parent household
and the children households until the parents divorce, reach age 65 (to avoid retirement issues) or
die. Finally, we drop income and consumption outliers by trimming the top and bottom 1% of the
income and consumption distributions as well as observations for which income or consumption
is not measured in consecutive years (since estimation relies on changes in yearly income and
consumption). This results in a final sample of 1,411 unique extended families consisting of a
parent household and their adult children households, as shown in Table 4. Parents and children
are on average 56 and 30 years old, respectively. Households within these extended families consist
of three individuals on average, and child households have at least one young child on average.
Income and consumption are slightly lower for child households, but not drastically so. Average
extended family size is three households, i.e. a parent household and two child households.
Our measure of income is net annual household income from the prior year (see Appendix D
for a more detailed description of our income and consumption measures). Specifically, we begin
with the sum of taxable (wage and salary income, asset income, and business profits) and transfer
(annuity, child support, retirement, SSI, TANF, UI, VA pension, welfare, workers compensation,
and food stamps) income of members of the household, net of taxes and, importantly, not including
help from family and friends. This measure allows us to control for the insurance that is offered by
the tax and benefit system, but not for any insurance provided by informal transfers. Finally, we
deflate income by the CPI-Urban deflator (with a base year of 1983-1984).
We use three measures of non-durable consumption. The first two stem from weekly food
expenditures, which we aggregate to the yearly level.19 Food consumption is defined as expenditures
on food eaten inside and outside the home as well as food stamps. We use this measure directly and
also to construct a measure of total consumption, which is imputed from food consumption using
18We treat splitting off as a terminal state. If an adult child later moves back in with their parents, the PSID
still classifies them as a separate household. Hence we still have separate income and consumption information that
allows us to treat them as a separate household in our analysis.
19The reference period for food expenditure is not clear, so we assume that it is the same as the reference period
for income, as previous work has done.
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Household size 2.79 3.09
(1.33) (1.45)






No high school degree 0.31 0.06
(0.46) (0.24)
High school graduate 0.34 0.38
(0.48) (0.48)
Lives in big city 0.33 0.35
(0.47) (0.48)
Annual income 33885 27996
(18706) (15029)
Annual imputed consumption 17731 14855
(11282) (9746)
Annual food consumption 4126 3746
(1820) (1738)
Annual reported consumption 8871 8415
(3655) (3909)
Extended family size 3.28
(1.24)
Number of unique extended families 1411
Number of family-year observations 8786
Years of data 25 (1980-2010)
Note: The sample includes extended families in the 1979-2011 PSID, where we define extended families as a cohabiting
couple under 65 and their adult children over 25. Income is defined as total income net of taxes and family transfers.
Imputed consumption is derived from a food demand system estimated on the CEX (see 5.2). Reported consumption
is only available from 1999-2009 and is defined as the sum of expenditures on food, transportation, utilities, and
home insurance. Income, imputed consumption, and reported consumption are deflated by the CPI-Urban deflator
and food consumption is deflated by the food CPI deflator. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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estimates from a food demand system estimated on the CEX (see Section 5.2). Starting in 1999,
the PSID began collecting information on additional consumption expenditures, so we construct a
“reported consumption” measure that including gasoline, other transportation expenses, utilities,
and home insurance.20 Reported and imputed consumption are deflated by the CPI-Urban deflator,
and food consumption is deflated by the food CPI deflator.
It is worth noting that these measures of consumption are based on expenditures, which is not
equivalent to consumption per se. They do not include any in-kind transfers, such as food gifts or
dinner invitations, or substituting expenditure with time (Aguiar and Hurst, 2005). To the extent
that this an important transfer mechanism we may be missing some of the insurance that may take
place.
5.2 Non-durable consumption from the CEX
To create a measure of non-durable consumption that spans the 1980-2010 period of our sample,
we impute consumption using estimates of a food demand equation (see Blundell, Pistaferri, and
Preston (2008) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2006) for more technical details) from the
1980-2010 CEX. The CEX is a short rotating panel survey of US households with detailed infor-
mation on hundreds of expenditure categories as well as demographic and earnings information.
The consumption definition we use is the sum of food (at home and outside the home), alcohol,
tobacco, and expenditure on other non-durable goods such as services, utilities, transportation ex-
penses, personal care, clothing, and footwear. For each year of data, we estimate a regression of
log food on the number of children, age, self-employment status, education, log consumption, and
log consumption interacted with education. The estimated coefficients are then used to impute a
measure of consumption in the PSID.
5.3 Estimation procedure
Estimation of the income and transmission parameters of the model involves three steps. First, we
construct a measure of the change in unexplained log income and log consumption for households
and calculate data covariances. Second, we estimate the parameters of the income process, and
20The PSID also collected data on health, childcare, education, and rent, but we exclude these categories to be
more consistent with our imputed consumption definition.
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third, we estimate the consumption transmission equation parameters.
In the first step, we remove the impact of deterministic and aggregate effects on log income
and log consumption by taking the residuals log yi,t and log ci,t of a regression of each variable on
dummies of household size, number of children under 18, age, education, race, region, whether the
household lives in a large city, whether the household is part of the SEO or immigrant sample,
and interactions of year with education, race, region, urbanicity, and SEO and immigrant sample
status. We take differences over time of each variable to obtain log unexplained income growth
and log unexplained consumption growth. To obtain the average growth by extended family,




j ∆ log yi,j,t and ∆ log cj,t = 1nj
∑
j ∆ log ci,j,t, where nj is the number of households in extended
family j. Finally we take covariances of these measures of income and consumption growth.
In the second and third steps, we estimate the parameters of the model with the moments
described in Section 4, using minimum distance.21 We use diagonally-weighted minimum distance,
which imposes that the weighting matrix is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are the diagonal
of the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix. This is similar to the optimal weighting matrix
except the off-diagonal elements are zero and hence we avoid problems related to optimal minimum
distance (Altonji and Segal, 1996). In the second step, we exclusively use income moments to
estimate the parameters of the income process. In the third step, we take the estimates of the
income parameters as given and use consumption moments as well as consumption crossed with
income moments to estimate parameters of the consumption model. We compute standard errors
using block bootstrap over all three steps of the estimation procedure, clustering at the extended
family level (Hall and Horowitz, 1996; Horowitz, 2001). This method allows us to account for
arbitrary serial correlation between extended family members and for the fact that the second and
third steps took the estimates from the previous steps as given.
6 Results
Our goal is to quantify the extent of insurance provided by a household’s extended family risk
sharing network. To arrive at this, we first characterize the structure of the income and consumption
21Estimating family-average moments is complicated by the fact that nj is not constant within our sample. See
Appendix B for a short discussion of this issue.
26
processes, and then estimate the relevant parameters.
6.1 Characterization of the income and consumption processes
Figure 1 plots variances and first-order autocovariances of residual log income growth by year at
both the household level and the family-average level (see Appendix Table 1 for point estimates
and standard errors). The family-average variances are much smaller than the household variances.
This result is expected, since variances of household level income reflect both purely idiosyncratic
and family-average shock variances, while family-average variances reflect only the latter. The size
of the difference, however, gives an idea of how much of the idiosyncratic income variance could
potentially be insured by the extended family. A second feature to note about the variances is
that variances after 1996 are considerably larger than before 1996. This difference can be partially
explained by the fact that the PSID started collecting data biennially beginning in 1996: the lightest
gray lines prior to 1996 depict what the variance estimates would be if only even years of data were
available, and show that they are almost always higher than the variances derived from single-year
differences. We take into account this change in survey structure in the estimation below (details
can also be found in Appendix C).
In terms of the first-order autocovariances, both the household and extended family level autoco-
variances are negative (consistent with previous literature), and the household level autocovariance
is considerably larger in absolute value than the extended family average autocovariance, similarly
to the variance patterns. In addition, the ratio of the first order autocovariaces to the variances
for the individual and family level shocks is roughly of the same order of magnitude, which helps
corroborate our assumption that the MA(1) parameter θ is consistent over time. We additionally
use second-order autocorrelations, at least prior to 1996, to help characterize and identify param-
eters of the income process (see Appendix Table 1). These autocorrelations are even smaller, in
absolute value, than the first order autocorrelations and are often not significantly different from
zero. When they are, they are typically negative, which also justifies our modeling specification as
these moments should be small and negative.
Figure 2 repeats the exercise in Figure 1 but with consumption (and similarly, see Appendix
Table 2 for point estimates and standard errors). As with income, there are large differences
between household and family-average variances, and we again note the large differences between
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Note: This figure reports variances of log income growth (circle markers) and first-order autocovariances of log income
growth (x markers) at the individual household level (black) and the family-average level (gray), where individual
households are denoted by i and family averages are denoted by j, as defined in Section 3.3. The vertical lines at 1994
and 1996 indicate PSID changes in income coding and survey frequency, respectively. The lightest gray lines denote
the variances and covariances derived from long-differences if only even years were available. The sample includes
“families” in the 1979-2011 PSID, where we define “families” as a cohabiting couple under 65 and their adult children
over 25. Income is defined as total income net of taxes and family transfers.
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Note: This figure reports variances of log consumption growth (circle markers) and first-order autocovariances of
log consumption growth (x markers) at the individual household level (black) and family-average level (gray) where
individual households are denoted by i and family averages denoted by j, as defined in Section 3.3. The vertical line
at 1996 indicates a change in PSID survey frequency. The lightest gray lines denote the variances and covariances
derived from long-differences if only even years were available. Gaps in the late 1980’s are due to missing food
consumption questions in 1988 and 1989. The sample includes “families” in the 1979-2011 PSID, where we define
“families” as a cohabiting couple under 65 and their adult children over 25. Consumption is imputed and is derived
from a food demand system estimated on the CEX (see 5.2).
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variances prior to and after 1996. Unlike income, the first-order autocovariances fully consist of
measurement error in consumption (for single-year differences, at least; see equations (23) and (28)
in the appendix), which includes both recall error and error from the imputation procedure. Finally,
higher-order autocovariances are insignificant (not shown), which – like income – is consistent with
the implications of the model.
6.2 Parameter estimation
To the best of our knowledge, this section presents the first characterisation of the income process
that decomposes the shocks a household receives in those of the extended family and those that are
idiosyncratic to the individual household. In Table 5, we report average estimates of the income
process.22 As mentioned above, we assume that the persistence parameter of transitory shocks θ
is the same for the idiosyncratic and family-average components of income, while the variances are
allowed to differ.
The first thing to note is that both permanent (columns 1 and 2) and transitory (columns 4
and 5) shocks are important sources of risk. More importantly for the purposes of this paper is
to compare the magnitude of the idiosyncratic component to the family-aggregate component of
shocks, which effectively determines the amount of opportunity there is for the extended family to
share risk. At one extreme, if individuals’ shocks (ui,t and ei,t, i.e., the sum of the idiosyncratic and
family-aggregate components) are perfectly positively correlated among extended family members,
the extended family is an ineffective group within which to share risk, because each member is
faced with the same shock (in other words, the idiosyncratic component is zero). At the other
extreme, if shocks are perfectly negatively correlated among extended family members, the family
can completely smooth fluctuations between extended family members (in other words, the family-
aggregate component is zero).
We find that the idiosyncratic component of income accounts for a substantial proportion of
the variance of the overall permanent and transitory shocks. For both types of shocks, on average,
the idiosyncratic component makes up around 60% of the overall variance of the shock, as shown
in columns (3) and (6). This means that over 60% of shocks are potentially insurable by extended
family risk sharing networks. The question, of course, is the extent to which it does.
22For the full set of time-varying income parameter estimates, see Appendix Table 3.
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Table 5: Income process estimates
Variance of permanent shocks Variance of transitory shocks
var(uIi,j,t) var(uFi,j,t) % insurable var(eIi,j,t) var(eFi,j,t) % insurable
(idiosyncratic) (family) by family (idiosyncratic) (family) by family
0.017 0.011 0.578 0.027 0.015 0.644
(0.003) (0.002) (0.054) (0.008) (0.004) (0.043)
θ (serial correlation of transitory shock) 0.163
(0.142)
var(my) (income measurement error variance) 0.015
(0.011)
Note: This table reports pooled estimates of the income process (Appendix Table 3 reports the year-by-year estimates)
where idiosyncratic household and family-aggregate components are defined as in Section 3.3. Columns 1-3 report
estimates for permanent shocks and columns 5-7 report estimates for transitory shocks. Columns 3 and 7 report the
percent of the total income shock that is potentially insurable by the extended family. The sample includes “families”
in the 1979-2011 PSID, where we define “families” as a cohabiting couple under 65 and their adult children over 25.
Income is defined as total income net of taxes and family transfers. Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100
block bootstrap replications, clustered by extended family.
There are two other important aspects to note before moving onto the insurance estimates.
First, the estimates of the transitory shock variances are purged of measurement error. As shown
in Appendix A, we are able to separately identify the variance of measurement error from transitory
shocks. Our estimate, var(my)=0.015, is remarkably close to the estimate of 0.0138 used in Meghir
and Pistaferri (2004) and subsequent papers using similar estimation strategies, which is based on
Bound and Krueger (1991)’s validation study of CPS data. However, our estimate is noisy, as is
the MA parameter on the transitory shock. If the true θ is in fact zero, then the variance of the
measurement error of income is not identified using income data alone. We run robustness checks
in which we use an external estimate of the variance of measurement error, as well as setting θ = 0.
Results (not shown, but available on request) are almost identical. Second, we estimated the overall
income processes separately for younger households (heads aged 25-44) and older households (heads
aged 45-64), and did not find any difference in the variance of their shocks.23 Thus it does not
appear that older households in our sample have systematically more stable income processes than
younger households.
Before discussing the extended family insurance estimates, Table 6 presents partial insurance
estimates based on a model in which the household may be a member of some unspecified insurance
network, or indeed just self insured based on their own assets. In other words, we ignore the division
23Pooling all years together, the variance of the permanent (transitory) shocks for younger households is 0.033
(0.035) while those of the older households is 0.032 (0.040).
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of income into an extended family and household component. This is essentially the Blundell,
Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) model except that our income measure includes fluctuations that
may occur due to changes in employment, while Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) effectively
only allow for shocks to wages.24
Table 6: Partial insurance estimates
δ (Permanent) γ (Transitory)
All years (1980-2008)
Imputed consumption 0.499 -0.006
(0.093) (0.052)
Food consumption 0.313 -0.026
(0.058) (0.034)
Recent years (1998-2008)
Reported consumption 0.283 0.042
(0.085) (0.065)
Imputed consumption 0.347 0.073
(0.141) (0.110)
Food consumption 0.234 -0.006
(0.088) (0.064)
Note: This table reports partial insurance estimates against permanent shocks (column (1)) and transitory shocks
(column (2)) based on equation (6) for various measures of consumption. Slope heterogeneity and time-varying
measurement error variances also estimated but not reported. The sample includes “families” in the 1979-2011 PSID,
where we define “families” as a cohabiting couple under 65 and their adult children over 25. Imputed consumption is
derived from a food demand system estimated on the CEX (see Section 5.2). Reported consumption is only available
from 1996-2009 and is defined as the sum of expenditures on food, transportation, utilities, and home insurance.
Imputed consumption and reported consumption are deflated by the CPI-Urban deflator and food consumption is
deflated by the food CPI deflator. Standard errors based on 100 block bootstrap replications (clustered at the
extended family level) are in parentheses.
To perform this exercise, we sum the idiosyncratic and family-aggregate components of income
estimated above and estimate the consumption parameters as in equation (6). Consistent with prior
work, we cannot reject the hypothesis that transitory shocks are completely smoothed and not re-
flected in consumption (column 2). Of course this could happen either through intra-household and
intra-family transfers or through self-insurance (savings). In contrast, households do not perfectly
smooth permanent shocks (column 1). Over the full time span of our data (1980-2008), a 10% de-
crease in permanent income is associated with a 5.0% decrease in non-durable consumption, a 3.1%
decrease in food consumption. For reported non-durable consumption, which is only available since
1998, this income decrease is associated with a 2.8% decrease in consumption.25 This evidence on
24There is a logic to controlling for changes in employment since this is in part an endogenous decision. However
our model does not allow for labor supply and it is also hard to control for fluctuations in employment and at the
same time control for its endogeneity, something that is ignored in Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008).
25Note that when we estimate δ using imputed consumption over the same time period as reported consumption,
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the pass-through of permanent shocks is also consistent with prior work and unsurprising given that
the lifetime effect of a permanent shock is much larger than a transitory shock. However, the fact
that 50% of the decrease in income does not translate into non-durable consumption indicates that
there is a substantial amount of insurance against shocks to disposable income above and beyond
the government tax and transfer system, which we explicitly take into account. As we argue in this
paper, the observed level of insurance may be due to a number of different channels. It may be
because of self-insurance through assets, or because of insurance within various networks. We now
turn our focus to whether it is because of the extended family network.
Table 7 reports estimates of the partial within-family insurance coefficients. The first group of
estimates show transmission parameters of permanent shocks, and the second group of estimates
show transmission parameters of transitory shocks. For both groups, the second column (δF and γF )
reports the transmission of shocks that are aggregate to the extended family and hence not insurable
through extended family networks, while the first column (δI and γI) reports the transmission of the
idiosyncratic component of shocks which are therefore insurable through extended family networks.
The difference between these columns (δF − δI and γF − γI), reported in column 3, quantifies the
level of extended family insurance. As found in the overall insurance estimates of Table 6, transitory
shocks are fully insured. This is even true for shocks that are aggregate to the extended family,
suggesting that households are able to insure these shocks through other means, such as savings.
For permanent shocks, despite the finding of partial insurance in Table 6, we find no evidence
that this partial insurance is driven by insurance within the extended family. For the full year
sample, the difference between the transmission of extended family-aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks (column 3) is very close to zero. This difference is larger when the sample is constrained to
more recent years (for which we additionally have reported consumption), but these effects are still
relatively small. This suggests that at least overall the extended family in the US is not a source
of partial insurance.
While we find no evidence of insurance within the extended family here, the results in Section 2
show that transfers between extended family members occur, and are responsive to shocks. These
two results are not necessarily inconsistent. First, the mere existence of transfers does not imply
the value of δ decreases by one-third. This may explain part of the difference in the estimates using the two measures
of consumption.
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Table 7: Extended family insurance estimates
Permanent Transitory
δI δF δF − δI γI γF γF − γI
(idiosyncratic) (family) (idiosyncratic) (family)
All years (1980-2008)
Imputed 0.494 0.516 0.022 -0.022 0.020 0.042
(0.139) (0.103) (0.159) (0.070) (0.071) (0.094)
Food 0.323 0.286 -0.037 -0.031 -0.012 0.019
(0.084) (0.061) (0.093) (0.043) (0.046) (0.059)
Recent years (1998-2008)
Reported 0.215 0.355 0.139 0.081 0.038 -0.043
(0.165) (0.143) (0.229) (0.125) (0.077) (0.142)
Imputed 0.278 0.449 0.170 0.183 0.008 -0.175
(0.249) (0.256) (0.368) (0.232) (0.150) (0.281)
Food 0.215 0.255 0.040 0.023 -0.021 -0.044
(0.126) (0.148) (0.185) (0.108) (0.090) (0.141)
Note: This table reports partial insurance estimates against permanent shocks (columns (1)-(3)) and transitory shocks
(columns (4)-(6)) based on equation (8) for various measures of consumption. Columns (3) and (6) report the level of
extended family insurance. Slope heterogeneity and time-varying measurement error variances also estimated but not
reported. The sample includes “families” in the 1979-2011 PSID, where we define “families” as a cohabiting couple
under 65 and their adult children over 25. Imputed consumption is derived from a food demand system estimated
on the CEX (see Section 5.2). Reported consumption is only available from 1996-2009 and is defined as the sum of
expenditures on food, transportation, utilities, and home insurance. Imputed consumption and reported consumption
are deflated by the CPI-Urban deflator and food consumption is deflated by the food CPI deflator. Standard errors
based on 100 block bootstrap replications (clustered at the extended family level) are in parentheses.
an insurance relationship: households may transfer money for other reasons, such as gifts (e.g.,
birthdays) or social norms (e.g., parents often pay for higher education and weddings). This is
consistent with the relatively larger transfers from parents to children and smaller transfers to
other family members in Tables 1 and 2, and other evidence of parental transfers for particular life
events (McGarry, 2016). Second, our evidence on transfers in response to income shocks (Table
3) shows that parents provide significantly more monetary transfers to their children when their
children have more negative income shocks, but it is difficult to interpret this result from a risk-
sharing perspective because (a) risk-sharing suggests that a similar result would appear for child
transfers to parents who receive negative income shocks, (b) the results are relatively small (children
in the bottom 25% of the income shock distribution are only 13 percentage points more likely to
receive a transfer than children in the top 25%) and only speak to the extensive margin of transfers,
and (c) perhaps most importantly, these regressions do not condition on the extended family budget
constraint. In other words, if other extended family members also had negative shocks, we would
not necessarily expect to see transfers.
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Why is there no detectable insurance within the extended family? In the next section we rerun
our analysis for various subsamples to understand whether it is due to moral hazard problems,
certain types of shocks, and whether certain characteristics of extended families are better able to
insure its members. We also examine the robustness of our results to measurement problems and
alternative definitions of extended family shocks.
7 Robustness
In this section we conduct additional robustness exercises to our main result of a lack of within-
extended family insurance. We first run our estimation procedure on additional sub-samples to
explore potential non-linearities in insurance. We then analytically derive the impact of mismea-
suring the proper extended family. Finally, we theoretically and empirically explore the role of
correlated shocks across extended family members. Our main findings remain true, but the find-
ings of this section suggest interesting extensions when applying our framework to other risk-sharing
settings.
7.1 Additional sample breakdowns
The estimates in the previous section imply that over the whole population of extended families
in our sample, there is no evidence of extended family insurance. However, this overall result may
mask heterogeneity across sub-populations, which may also provide insight into the underlying
mechanisms for why risk-sharing between extended family members succeeds or fails. Table 8 shows
estimates for various sample breakdowns, concentrating on the imputed consumption measure over
all years of data.
One reason risk sharing might break down is moral hazard or incomplete (and asymmetric)
information: in an environment in which households have an incentive to shirk or hide assets, perfect
risk-sharing is not always attainable. One interpretation of the results in the previous section is that
the extended family in the US is not sufficiently linked to be able to improve monitoring of actions
and verification of shocks. While our framework cannot directly test this theory, row 1 in Table 8
shows estimates for extended families in which all members live in the same state. This restriction
captures the idea that extended families that live near one another may be more likely to monitor
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Table 8: Extended family insurance estimates, various subsamples
Permanent Transitory
δI δF δF − δI γI γF γF − γI
(idiosyncratic) (family) (idiosyncratic) (family)
Same state 0.416 0.619 0.203 0.015 -0.060 -0.076
(0.171) (0.132) (0.215) (0.087) (0.100) (0.121)
Small extended family 0.582 0.610 0.029 0.030 0.013 -0.017
(0.243) (0.171) (0.303) (0.299) (0.259) (0.534)
Negative employment shock 0.259 0.151 -0.107 0.111 -0.044 -0.155
(0.192) (0.080) (0.185) (0.162) (0.064) (0.172)
Large negative income shock 0.508 0.320 -0.188 -0.168 -0.093 0.076
(0.244) (0.119) (0.288) (0.117) (0.110) (0.173)
High wealth 0.365 0.361 -0.004 -0.062 0.088 0.151
(0.138) (0.112) (0.179) (0.364) (0.153) (0.445)
Low wealth 0.603 0.471 -0.131 -0.087 0.049 0.135
(0.185) (0.142) (0.234) (1.260) (0.103) (1.268)
No parental coresidence 0.560 0.590 0.030 -0.053 -0.018 0.035
(0.143) (0.102) (0.158) (0.075) (0.099) (0.106)
Kids unmarried 0.123 0.413 0.290 0.157 -0.671 -0.828
(0.299) (0.188) (0.348) (1.292) (0.905) (1.782)
Note: This table reports partial insurance estimates against permanent shocks (columns (1)-(3)) and transitory shocks
(columns (4)-(6)) based on equation (8) for various measures of consumption and various subsamples. Columns (3)
and (6) report the level of extended family insurance. Slope heterogeneity and time-varying measurement error
variances also estimated but not reported. Subsample analyses (run separately) use imputed consumption and
set var(my) = 0.014. The sample includes “families” in the 1979-2011 PSID, in which we define “families” as a
cohabiting couple under 65 and their adult children over 25. Imputed consumption is derived from a food demand
system estimated on the CEX (see 5.2) and is deflated by the CPI-Urban deflator. ‘Same state’ is defined as all
family members living in the same state; ‘small extended family’ is families consisting of the parent and one child
household; ‘negative employment shock’ is households that transitioned from employment to non-employment (for the
consumption sample only); ‘large negative income shock’ is households whose residual log income change was in the
bottom quartile (for the consumption sample only); ‘high wealth’ and ‘low wealth’ are families whose parent household
average assets over the sample are in the top and bottom 40% of the asset distribution of parents, respectively; ‘no
parental coresidence’ is families in which the child household never moves back into the parent household; ‘kids
unmarried’ are families in which all child households are unmarried. Standard errors based on 100 block bootstrap
replications (clustered at the extended family level) are in parentheses.
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the behavior and events of each other than families who are more geographically disperse. Focusing
on the permanent shocks, the results of this exercise show suggestive evidence that families who
live near one another provide some insurance to one another: while extended family insurance is
δF − δI = 0.02 for all extended families, it is δF − δI = 0.20 for geographically close extended
families. This number is imprecisely estimated, however, so while highly suggestive, this evidence
cannot be taken as conclusive because we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the
same. A larger data set would be useful to pursue this channel further, as would more detailed
information on geographic distance. Of course, there is also the possibility that distance itself
is endogenous in the sense that families with weaker links are more likely to live far apart from
each other. An additional sample that may also be better than average at curbing moral hazard
problems is small extended families since there are fewer people to “monitor.” Row 2 shows the
results for the sample of families with two households (i.e., the parent household and one child
household), and finds no evidence of extended family insurance for this sample.
A second theory of extended family interactions is that extended family members provide trans-
fers when large income shocks occur (such as a job loss), but less so for small income shocks. Such
large shocks may be easier to verify. Moreover, this could be the result of an underlying model of
transfer frictions, in which families must pay a monetary or utility cost to give or receive trans-
fers. To examine this non-linearity hypothesis further, we restrict the consumption sample in two
different ways: first, to households that transitioned from employment to non-employment in row
3, and second, to households whose residual income change was in the bottom 25th percentile
in row 4.26 For both of these samples, there is no evidence of extended family insurance; in
fact, the within-family insurance for the large negative income shocks run is even wrong-signed.
Interestingly, however, negative employment shocks are overall better insured (only around 20%
pass-through) than the overall sample of shocks, and also better insured than unspecified large neg-
ative shocks. One interpretation of these findings is that taggable shocks such as unemployment
are more generally insurable than other shocks, potentially due to their visibility and verifiability.
Another important mechanism for insuring shocks is self-insurance. To explore how self-
insurance interacts with extended family insurance, rows 5 and 6 split the sample into families
26The income estimates for these samples remain the full sample estimates; it is just the consumption parameters
that are estimated on these restricted samples.
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whose parents’ average assets over the sample period (defined as asset income divided by the inter-
est rate, plus housing assets) are in the top and bottom 40% of the asset distribution of parents,
respectively. Families with larger asset holdings are better able to self-insure, which may translate
into a higher willingness to insure other family members. We find that generally the transmission
of permanent shocks is lower for high-asset families than low-asset families, which is consistent
with a simple consumption-savings model in which families with higher assets are better able to
self-insure. On the other hand, we are not be able to reject that the difference between the two sets
of estimates is zero. This points in the direction of self-insurance as the main mechanism, rather
than intra-family transfers.
The final two rows explore robustness to the way we measure consumption and the risk-sharing
network. One concern is that we are incorrectly measuring extended family insurance provided
through alternative means, such as coresidence. If some families provide insurance through mon-
etary transfers and other families provide insurance through in-kind transfers, then we may be
mis-measuring the extent of monetary insurance by including the families that provide in-kind
transfers. To explore this, Row 7 excludes extended families in which the child households move
back in with the parent household at some point during the sample period. For this sample, which
may be more likely to engage in monetary transfers, we again see no evidence of extended family
insurance. Finally, the last row explores the extent to which we are missing other members of
the risk-sharing network by only including extended families in which the children are unmarried,
because married children may additionally have access to insurance from the spouse’s extended
family. This is a very small sample of less than 2,600 households, so the estimates are not pre-
cise, but this specification – at least for permanent shocks – results in some amount of extended
family insurance. Given these results, the next subsection provides an analytical framework for
understanding the possible mis-measurement of risk-sharing groups.
7.2 Mismeasuring the extended family
In all of our analyses, we assume that we have defined, and observed, the appropriate members of
the risk-sharing group. How do the insurance results change if we mismeasure who is in the group?
To answer this, we analytically derive the bias of the insurance coefficients under three separate
scenarios: (1) the measured group is missing one member of the true group, (2) the measured group
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includes an extra member that is not in the true group, and (3) the measured group has swapped
an incorrect member in place of a true member.
Consider a simple model of extended family risk-sharing of permanent shocks:
∆ log yi,j,t = ui,j,t = uFj,t + uIi,j,t (11)
∆ log ci,j,t = δFuFj,t + δIuIi,j,t (12)
in which ui,j,t are drawn from an IID distribution with mean zero and variance σ2u. This is equiv-
alent to Equations (7) and (8) without transitory shocks, measurement error, or consumption
heterogeneity. While the following analysis could be easily extended to include transitory shocks,
we focus on permanent shocks for simplicity and because they are more pertinent for risk-sharing
since transitory shocks are well-insured even without risk-sharing. Identification of the insurance






var(∆ log c)− var(∆ log c)
var(∆ log y)− var(∆ log y)
(14)
where the ∆ log y and ∆ log c signify averages over the group (with the subscripts suppressed).
Table 9: Effect of mismeasuring the group on insurance parameters
Group type δ2F δ2I
True group δ2F δ2I
Missing member N−1N δ
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Suppose that the true group consists of N members. Table 9 shows the values of δ2F and δ2I when
the measured group contains N − 1 members (row 2), N + 1 members (row 3) and N members but
one of them is not part of the true group (row 4).27 Overall, this table shows that when the risk-
sharing group is mismeasured, the measured transmission parameters are a convex combination
27Appendix Table 4 shows the corresponding measured income and consumption variances that generate these
insurance values.
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of the two true transmission parameters, and the amount of bias depends on the size N of the
risk-sharing group. In the context of extended families, arguably the most relevant case is when a
member of the group is missing, e.g. a parent’s sibling is also a member of the true risk-sharing
group. In this case, interestingly, our method recovers the true transmission of idiosyncratic shocks.
However, the main object of interest is the difference between the transmission of family-aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks, δF −δI . Figure 3 quantifies the error in the measured amount of extended
family insurance, or (δF − δI)meas − (δF − δI)true for different levels of the true transmission of the
idiosyncratic shock δtrueI (x-axis), different levels of the true transmission of the family-aggregate
shock δtrueF (100% transmission in solid and 50% transmission in dashes), and different size groups
(shading).
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true ⩵ 1. δFtrue ⩵ 0.5
Panel C: Wrong member
Note: The figures correspond to the difference between the extent of measured extended family insurance (δmeasF −
δmeasI ) minus the extent of true extended family insurance (δtrueF − δtrueI ), for three cases: (A) the measured group is
missing one true member, (B) the measured group includes an extra non-member, and (C) the measured group swaps
out a true member for a non-member. For each case, the bias is plotted by the true transmission of idiosyncratic
shocks (δI) on the x-axis and two values of the true transmission of family-aggregate shocks: δF = 1.0 (solid) and
δF = 0.5 (dashed). For each of those two cases, the bias is plotted for group sizes of N = 3 (black), N = 5 (medium
gray), and N = 25 (light gray).
The first thing to note from Figure 3 is that the measured amount of extended family insurance
is weakly lower than the true amount of extended family insurance. If the true extended family
insurance is zero, then there is no bias, but the bias increases in absolute terms as the true extended
family insurance increases (i.e., moving left along the x-axis or jumping between the solid and dashed
lines). The amount of this bias is also affected by the size of the network: as N increases (moving
from dark to lightly shaded lines), the bias decreases. Concentrating on Panel A, in which the
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measured group is missing a true group member, the worst case scenario represented is a 20% bias
in the extended family insurance estimate for a group size of N = 3 and 100% true extended family
insurance. Thus, for a true group size of N = 3, at worst our method could underestimate the
amount of insurance by 20%. However, under this scenario, because we recover the true δI , which
is closer to 0.5 in our data than 0.0, the extended family insurance bias is significantly smaller. In
addition, because many families in our data have more than three households, the bias should be
even smaller. Thus, while mismeasurement of groups can cause bias in our estimates of extended
family insurance, we do not believe the bias is very large nor does it change our main conclusions.
7.3 Extended family shocks
In our main analysis, we have been agnostic about the origins of family-aggregate shocks, which
could be due to small groups and/or because the income processes are genuinely correlated. We
have, however, imposed the restriction that the MA coefficient (θ) is the same for idiosyncratic and
family-aggregate shocks. Here we look closer at the implications of correlated shocks and consider
two cases:
1. Benchmark case: ∆ log yi,j,t = vi,j,t in which v consist of entirely independent shocks across
individuals and follow the usual permanent-transitory decomposition. As defined above,
family-level shocks are ∆ log yi,j,t = vi,j,t.
2. “Genuine” extended family shock case: ∆ log yi,j,t = vi,j,t + aj,t in which v consist of entirely
independent shocks across individuals while a consist of aggregate shocks to extended fam-
ilies that are independent across extended families but perfectly correlated within extended
families. Both v and a follow the usual permanent-transitory decomposition. Family-level
shocks now consist of two different processes, ∆ log yi,j,t = vi,j,t + aj,t.
The important distinction between these cases is that the distribution of “v” shocks and “a” shocks
may be different, particularly the persistence of transitory shocks. Labelling family-aggregate
components of shocks that arise from the “v” distribution with a V -superscript and those that
arise from the “a” distribution with an A-superscript, the expanded income process is:




Estimates from this model yield small but significant “genuine” components: 22% (25%) of family-
aggregate permanent (transitory) shocks derive from a correlated shock distribution.28 However,
we cannot reject that the difference in persistence between the uncorrelated and correlated shock
distributions is zero, and thus unsurprisingly the insurance estimates are very similar to our main
estimates (estimates available upon request). In addition, this specification raises further caveats,
including the fact that the observability of “genuine” and other shocks may vary, making it harder
to interpret the extended family insurance estimates. Hence, our preferred specification remains
the parsimonious specification.
8 Discussion and conclusions
Income shocks to households are substantial, even accounting for the redistributive effects of taxa-
tion and welfare programs. It is well understood that such fluctuations can have very large welfare
effects (see for example Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010)) and yet on average only about half of
these fluctuations are insured.
A growing theoretical literature explores classes of underlying models that can generate this
“partial” insurance. This literature typically examines risk-sharing arrangements within a well-
defined group and under particular frictions, such as commitment problems (Kocherlakota, 1996;
Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2002) or moral hazard (Attanasio and Pavoni, 2011). Since the
extended family may be able to solve (at least in part) these issues that may otherwise plague groups
of households, one may expect the extended family network to provide some degree of insurance.
Empirically, Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996) and others have shown that complete extended
family insurance does not occur, but they cannot say whether some, or any, occurs. On the other
hand, other work has found evidence that extended family networks provide insurance through
particular (in-kind) channels, such as coresidence (Kaplan, 2012).
In this paper, we follow up and extend the literature on partial insurance in a number of
ways. In the first part of the paper, we present a framework of partial insurance and group risk
sharing that decomposes income shocks into shocks that are aggregate to the group – and thus
uninsurable by the group – and shocks that are idiosyncratic to particular group members, and
28Identification of this additional income process requires additional cross-individual covariances; contact the au-
thors for more details.
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therefore insurable by its other members. This allows us to study the differential impact of group-
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks on consumption. Using covariance restrictions on household
and group level income and consumption processes, we show how one can fully identify – including
measurement error parameters – the income and insurance parameters. In the second part, we apply
our framework to extended family networks in the United States. Exploiting the intergenerational
structure of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, our estimates of the income process imply that
a substantial portion (around 60%) of income shocks are idiosyncratic within extended family
networks. We argue that this implies a large potential for the extended family risk sharing network
to have a non-trivial impact on the transmission of income shocks into consumption. However, our
estimates of the transmission parameters show that no such insurance occurs on average. Thus,
despite the fact that public welfare programs do not fully insure income risk (for example, the
average replacement rate of unemployment insurance benefits in the US is around 60%), private
networks do not replace them.
These findings beg the question of why extended families do not provide insurance for its
members. Are families not as able to solve commitment and moral hazard problems as one might
think? Are there social or cultural barriers to sharing risk? Developing insights into the frictions
that prevent families from sharing risk is an interesting avenue for future research.
In conclusion, while we apply this framework to study extended families in the United States,
we believe that it is more generally applicable to any group of households whom we suspect may
collectively share risk, such as rural villagers in developing countries or other close-knit communities.
By considering the difference between group-aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to a network, the
framework presented in this paper allows us to detect whether risk sharing takes place and to
distinguish it from alternative theoretical benchmarks like complete markets and self-insurance.
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To estimate the income and consumption parameters of our model, we minimize the distance
between data covariances and a combination of parameters specified by our model. We use the
following moments for identification and estimation, where the left-hand side is data and the right-
hand side consists of the parameters of the model.
1. Income
Household autocovariances
cov(∆yi,j,t,∆yi,j,t) = var(uIt ) + var(eIt ) + (θ − 1)2var(eIt−1) + θ2var(eIt−2) (16)
+ var(uFt ) + var(eFt ) + (θ − 1)2var(eFt−1) + θ2var(eFt−2) + 2var(my)
cov(∆yi,j,t,∆yi,j,t+1) = (θ − 1)var(eIt ) − θ(θ − 1)var(eIt−1) (17)
+ (θ − 1)var(eFt ) − θ(θ − 1)var(eFt−1) − var(my)
cov(∆yi,j,t,∆yi,j,t+2) = −θvar(eIt ) − θvar(eFt ) (18)
Extended family-average autocovariances








cov(∆yj,t,∆yj,t+2) = −θvar(eFt ) (21)
Identification of the income parameters follows from a combination of these 6 moments:
1. From (21) we know var(eFt ) = −
cov(∆yj,t,∆yj,t+2)







2. Subtracting nj times (20) from (17) and plugging the formulas for var(eFt ) and var(eIt ) into
this identifies θ from the following implicit equation:
cov(∆yi,j,t,∆yi,j,t+1) − njcov(∆yj,t,∆yj,t+1) = (θ − 1)var(eIt ) − θ (θ − 1) var(eIt−1)
− (nj − 1)(θ − 1)var(eFt ) + (nj − 1)θ(θ − 1)var(eFt−1)
1. With θ identified, (21) identifies var(eFt ) and consequently (18) identifies var(eIt )
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2. (20) or (17) then identifies var(my).
3. (19) identifies var(uFt ).
4. (16) identifies var(uIt ).
Measurement error in income, which is notoriously difficult to identify separately from transitory
shocks, can be isolated in this model. In most income models, measurement error is not separately
identified from transitory shocks because the variance of measurement error co-moves one-for-one
with the variance of the transitory shock. Our model puts structure on the transitory shocks that
inadvertently allows us to separately identify these shocks from measurement error (as well as
from each other). In the household autocovariances (equations (16) through (18)), measurement
error co-moves one-for-one with transitory shocks (similarly to most income models). In family-
average autocovariances (equations (19) through (21)), it does not. The reason for this is two-
fold. First, because the sum of all transitory idiosyncratic shocks of family members is zero by
definition, transitory idiosyncratic shocks do not move one-for-one with measurement error. Second,
each family member receives the same transitory family-aggregate shock but receives different
measurement error realizations. Thus, since the variance of an average is equal to 1/nj of the
variance of a variable, the variance of measurement error enters 1/nj-to-one with the variance of
the transitory family-aggregate shock, allowing us to separately identify the two parameters.29
2. Consumption
Identification of consumption parameters δI , δF , γI , γF , var(ξ), and var(mc,t) follows from a com-
bination of consumption autocovariances and income-consumption covariances.
29Note that we are under-identified if the transitory component does not have persistence (θ = 0) and we restrict
identification to solely income covariances. However, all income parameters would still be identified if we included
consumption covariances (contact authors for the identification proof).
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Household autocovariances
cov(∆ci,j,t,∆ci,j,t) = δ2I var(uIt ) + γ2I (1 + θ)2var(eIt ) + δ2F var(uFt ) + γ2F (1 + θ)2var(eFt ) (22)
+ var(mc,t) + var(mc,t−1) + var(ξ)
cov(∆ci,j,t,∆ci,j,t+1) = −var(mc,t) (23)
cov(∆ci,j,t,∆yi,j,t) = δIvar(uIt ) + γI(1 + θ)var(eIt ) + δF var(uFt ) + γF (1 + θ)var(eFt ) (24)
cov(∆ci,j,t,∆yi,j,t+1) = γI(1 + θ)(θ − 1)var(eIt ) + γF (1 + θ)(θ − 1)var(eFt ) (25)
cov(∆ci,j,t,∆yi,j,t+2) = −γIθ(1 + θ)var(eIt ) − γF (1 + θ)θvar(eFt ) (26)
Family-average autocovariances
cov(∆cj,t,∆cj,t) = δ2F var(uFt ) + γ2F (1 + θ)2var(eFt ) +
1
ni





cov(∆cj,t,∆yj,t) = δF var(uFt ) + γF (1 + θ)var(eFt ) (29)
cov(∆cj,t,∆yj,t+1) = γF (1 + θ)(θ − 1)var(eFt ) (30)
cov(∆cj,t,∆yj,t+2) = −γF θ(1 + θ)var(eFt ) (31)
Identification of consumption parameters is as follows:30
1. (23) or (28) identifies var(mc,t).
2. (30) or (31) identifies γF .
3. (25) or (26) identifies γI .
4. (29) identifies δF .
5. (24) identifies δI .
6. Either of (22) or (27) identifies var(ξ).
Appendix B: Estimating family-average moments
Family-average moments contain a multiplicative factor of 1/nj that is not constant between families
because families are not all the same size. As an example, take the variance of family-average
30Note that we are over-identified. It is theoretically possible to add more richness, such as allowing for the
possibility of correlation between income and consumption measurement errors. We abstract from this addition due
to data concerns. Contact authors for an identification proof with correlated measurement error.
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income:




From this equation it is easy to see that the variance of family-average income varies by extended
family size. This means that the distribution of income is a mixture distribution in which the
components are defined by the size of the extended family. In our estimation procedure, we must
modify the moments to account for this.
Let the mean of family-average income equal µ and let ws be the proportion of families of size






(µs − µ)2 + σ2s
]
where µs and σ2s are the mean and variance of family-average income for families of size s. Hence











Analogous logic follows for covariances of both income and consumption.
Appendix C: Long-difference moments
In 1999, the PSID switched from interviewing households every year to every other year. This will
affect our model for two reasons. First, we measure income and consumption at the yearly level,
so we are missing every other year of data from 1999 onwards. Second, our model is dynamic and
income is persistent, so income shocks that occur in off-survey years have repercussions to both
income and consumption in future years. To account for this, we define “long-differences” (with the
notation ∆2) as the two-year difference in income and consumption and rewrite covariances that
factors in this change.
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Income long-difference
∆2 log yi,j,t ≡ logyi,j,t − logyi,j,t−2 = uFj,t +uFj,t−1 +uIi,j,t +uIi,j,t−1 +∆2(eFj,t +θeFj,t−1)+∆2(eIi,j,t +θeIi,j,t−1)+∆2myi,j,t
We will not be able to separately identify uSi,j,t from uSi,j,t−1 for S ∈ F, I, so we will assign
var(uSt−1) = var(uSt ). Same goes for var(eSt−1).
cov(∆2yi,j,t,∆2yi,j,t) = 2var(uIt ) + (1 + θ2)var(eIt ) + (1 + θ2)var(eIt−2) (32)
+ 2var(uFt ) + (1 + θ2)var(eFt ) + (1 + θ2)var(eFt−2) + 2var(my)
cov(∆2yi,j,t,∆2yi,j,t+2) = −(1 + θ2)var(eIt ) − (1 + θ2)var(eFt ) − var(my) (33)








We cannot identify the MA(1) parameter (θ) or income measurement error (var(my)) using only
long-difference moments. In estimation, since we do not allow θ or var(my) to vary over time,
identification of these parameters comes from the short-difference covariances. Identification of the
income shock variances is then straightforward: (35) identifies var(eFt ), (34) identifies var(uFt ), (33)
identifies var(eIt ), and (32) identifies var(uIt ).
Consumption long-difference
∆2 log ci,j,t ≡ logci,j,t − logci,j,t−2 =δI(uIi,j,t + uIi,j,t−1) + γI(1 + θ)(eIi,j,t + eIi,j,t−1)
+ δF (uFj,t + uFj,t−1) + γF (1 + θ)(eFj,t + eFj,t−1) + ∆2mci,j,t + ξi,j,t + ξi,j,t−1
Analogously to the income shock variances, we cannot separately identify ξi,j,t from ξi,j,t−1, hence
we assign var(ξi,j,t−1) = var(ξi,j,t)
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cov(∆2ci,j,t,∆2ci,j,t) = 2δ2I var(uIt ) + 2δ2F var(uFt ) + 2γ2I (1 + θ)2var(eIt ) + 2γ2F (1 + θ)2var(eFt ) (36)
+ var(mc,t) + var(mc,t−2) + 2var(ξ)
cov(∆2ci,j,t,∆2ci,j,t+2) = −var(mc,t) (37)
cov(∆2yi,t,∆2ci,t) = 2δIvar(uIt ) + 2δF var(uFt ) + γI(1 + θ)2var(eIt ) + γF (1 + θ)2var(eFt ) (38)
cov(∆2yi,t+2,∆2ci,t) = −γI(1 + θ)2var(eIt ) − γF (1 + θ)2var(eFt ) (39)
cov(∆2ci,t,∆2ci,t) = 2δ2F var(uFt ) + 2γ2F (1 + θ)2var(eFt ) +
1
ni





cov(∆2yi,t,∆2ci,t) = 2δF var(uFt ) + γF (1 + θ)2var(eFt ) (42)
cov(∆2yi,t+2,∆2ci,t) = −γF (1 + θ)2var(eFt ) (43)
Identification
Identification of consumption parameters using long-difference covariances is analogous to the short
difference covariances: (37) or (41) identifies var(mc,t), (43) identifies γF , (42) identifies δF , (39)
identifies γI , (38) identifies δI , and finally (36) or (40) identifies var(ξ).
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Appendix D: Details on the PSID income and expenditure data
As summarized in Section 5.1, our main data source is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) from 1979 through 2011. In this appendix we provide more details about our income and
consumption measures and how they have evolved over time (see Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston
(2008) for details on the CEX data).
Income Our measure of household income is annual post tax-and-transfer income, excluding
transfers from family and friends. A household consists of a head and potentially a spouse and
other family members that live in the household. To construct this measure, we begin with the
PSID’s summary variable for total (nuclear) family money income from the previous tax year,
which consists of head and spouse taxable income, head and spouse transfer income, and other
(nuclear) family unit members’ taxable income and transfer income. This summary variable was
bottom coded at $1 prior to 1994, so we continue to bottom code this variable in later years for
consistency (this applies to only 12 observations in our sample). When the PSID became biennial
in 1999, additional income questions were asked about the gap years, but we do not incorporate
this data since we do not have consumption in gap years and other work has shown that recall bias
is large for these years.
Taxable income consists of income from wages and salary, assets, and business and farm profits,
and was collected for the head, spouse, and other (nuclear) family members. Transfer income con-
sists of alimony, annuity income, child support, help from relatives and non-relatives, Supplemental
Security income, Social Security old-age and disability income, unemployment insurance benefits,
worker’s compensation, welfare/TANF, retirement income, VA pension income, and other transfer
income. Total transfer income is collected for the head, spouse, and other (nuclear) family mem-
bers, but measures of each benefit are not always collected separately in all years (for a breakdown
of transfer questions by year and household member see Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009)). From
this measure of total income, we subtract alimony and child support given to others since alimony
and child support received is included in our measure of income, and we subtract transfers from rel-
atives and non-relatives. Note that questions about alimony and child support were only explicitly
asked beginning in the 1985 survey and only for the head and spouse, and transfers from relatives
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were not collected for other (nuclear) family members between 1994 and 2003 while transfers from
non-relatives were collected beginning in 1994 and only for the head and spouse. We also add the
monetary value of food stamps to our measure of household income.
We then subtract federal taxes from this income measure to obtain a post tax and (public)
transfers measure of income. Prior to 1991, the PSID provided computed federal taxes. From 1991
forward, we imputed federal taxes using the NBER’s TAXSIM program, following the assumptions
used by Meyer and Mok (2006) to link information in the PSID to the inputs needed by TAXSIM.
For the 45 observations in which TAXSIM does not provide a federal tax burden, we impute their
federal tax burden using a quintic in income, a quadratic in (nuclear) family size, number of children,
whether they are self-employed, and asset income. We drop income observations in which income is
truncated (132 observations) or outlier federal tax burdens (25 observations), and trim the bottom
and top 1% of the income distribution. Income is deflated by the CPI-Urban deflator.
Consumption We use three measures of non-durable consumption. The first two stem from
weekly food expenditures, which we aggregate to the yearly level. The reference period for food
expenditure is not clear, so we assume that it is the same as the reference period for income,
as previous work has done. Food consumption is defined as expenditures on food eaten inside
and outside the home as well as the dollar value of food stamps. Prior to 1993, non-food stamp
expenditure was collected separately for food consumed inside and outside the house, but afterwards
it separated out food delivered. We use this measure directly and also to construct a measure of
total consumption, which is imputed from food consumption using estimates from a food demand
system estimated on the CEX (see Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) for more details).
Starting in 1999, the PSID began collecting information on additional consumption expendi-
tures, including transportation expenses (gasoline, vehicle insurance, vehicle repairs, parking, bus
fares, taxi fares, and other transportation expenses), childcare, utilities (electricity, heating, water,
miscellaneous utilities), and home insurance. The PSID also collected data on health, education,
and rent, but we exclude these categories to be more consistent with our imputed consumption
definition, which is intended to capture non-durable consumption. In constructing this “reported
consumption” measure, missing categories are set to zero, unless all categories are missing, in which
case reported consumption is set to zero. Similar to income, for all consumption measures we trim
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the bottom and top 1% of their respective distributions. Reported and imputed consumption are
deflated by the CPI-Urban deflator, and food consumption is deflated by the food CPI deflator.
Appendix Tables
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Appendix Table 1: Autocovariance Matrix of Income Growth
Individual Autocovariances Family-average Autocovariances
Year var(∆yt) cov(∆yt+1,∆yt) cov(∆yt+2,∆yt) var(∆yt) cov(∆yt+1,∆yt) cov(∆yt+2,∆yt)
1979 0.102 -0.029 -0.006 0.042 -0.011 0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1980 0.100 -0.039 -0.002 0.038 -0.012 -0.005
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1981 0.111 -0.043 0.007 0.042 -0.013 0.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1982 0.115 -0.044 -0.002 0.043 -0.014 -0.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1983 0.105 -0.032 -0.010 0.037 -0.010 -0.007
(0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1984 0.105 -0.029 0.001 0.034 -0.006 0.001
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
1985 0.128 -0.034 -0.010 0.040 -0.008 -0.001
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1986 0.119 -0.041 -0.014 0.045 -0.015 -0.004
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1987 0.102 -0.024 -0.009 0.036 -0.008 -0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1988 0.106 -0.034 -0.011 0.036 -0.013 -0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1989 0.097 -0.028 -0.004 0.031 -0.008 -0.001
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1990 0.110 -0.046 0.011 0.038 -0.015 0.006
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
1991 0.114 -0.042 0.004 0.034 -0.013 -0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
1992 0.127 -0.066 -0.016 0.042 -0.016 -0.008
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
1993 0.164 -0.071 -0.000 0.051 -0.021 0.002
(0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
1994 0.206 -0.068 -0.018 0.076 -0.025 -0.012
(0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
1995 0.193 -0.071 NA 0.064 -0.027 NA
(0.024) (0.019) (0.006) (0.007)
1996 0.185 NA NA 0.075 NA NA
(0.020) (0.006)
1998 0.205 -0.079 NA 0.077 -0.029 NA
(0.022) (0.016) (0.008) (0.004)
2000 0.186 -0.043 NA 0.076 -0.027 NA
(0.019) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006)
2002 0.187 -0.069 NA 0.070 -0.029 NA
(0.028) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006)
2004 0.164 -0.056 NA 0.075 -0.023 NA
(0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004)
2006 0.152 -0.044 NA 0.066 -0.021 NA
(0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004)
2008 0.163 -0.074 NA 0.064 -0.032 NA
(0.014) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
2010 0.158 NA NA 0.064 NA NA
(0.013) (0.005)
Note: This table reports variances (columns (1) and (4)), first-order autocovariances (columns (2) and (5)) and
second-order autocovariances (columns (3) and (6)) of the income process where idiosyncratic household and family-
aggregate components are defined as in Section 3.3. The sample includes “families” in the 1979-2011 PSID, where we
define “families” as a cohabiting couple under 65 and their adult children over 25. Income is defined as total income
net of taxes and family transfers. Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 block bootstrap replications,
clustered by extended family.
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Appendix Table 2: Autocovariance Matrix of Consumption Growth
Autocovariances Family-average Autocovariances
Year var(∆ct) cov(∆ct+1,∆ct) var(∆ct) cov(∆ct+1,∆ct)
1981 0.345 -0.132 0.118 -0.042
(0.028) (0.019) (0.009) (0.005)
1982 0.310 -0.132 0.111 -0.035
(0.027) (0.021) (0.008) (0.006)
1983 0.315 -0.115 0.105 -0.033
(0.026) (0.015) (0.007) (0.004)
1984 0.293 -0.132 0.106 -0.047
(0.022) (0.016) (0.007) (0.006)
1985 0.338 -0.142 0.114 -0.039
(0.028) (0.026) (0.008) (0.007)
1986 0.327 NA 0.108 NA
(0.027) (0.008)
1990 0.313 -0.113 0.080 -0.027
(0.023) (0.015) (0.004) (0.003)
1991 0.309 -0.155 0.096 -0.053
(0.021) (0.020) (0.005) (0.005)
1992 0.345 -0.135 0.127 -0.042
(0.028) (0.022) (0.010) (0.007)
1993 0.327 -0.154 0.115 -0.048
(0.031) (0.031) (0.009) (0.008)
1994 0.314 -0.118 0.111 -0.039
(0.034) (0.025) (0.012) (0.013)
1995 0.343 -0.177 0.139 -0.062
(0.041) (0.045) (0.016) (0.015)
1996 0.343 NA 0.135 NA
(0.045) (0.015)
1998 0.355 -0.149 0.114 -0.060
(0.030) (0.028) (0.009) (0.010)
2000 0.414 -0.163 0.154 -0.057
(0.034) (0.028) (0.012) (0.010)
2002 0.445 -0.223 0.165 -0.070
(0.046) (0.056) (0.013) (0.016)
2004 0.540 -0.232 0.216 -0.101
(0.058) (0.044) (0.019) (0.016)
2006 0.472 -0.171 0.206 -0.055
(0.038) (0.028) (0.015) (0.010)
2008 0.549 NA 0.199 NA
(0.041) (0.015)
Note: This table reports variances (columns (1) and (4)), first-order autocovariances (columns (2) and (5)) and
second-order autocovariances (columns (3) and (6)) of the income process where idiosyncratic household and family-
aggregate components are defined as in Section 3.3. The sample includes “families” in the 1979-2011 PSID, where
we define “families” as a cohabiting couple under 65 and their adult children over 25. Consumption is imputed and
is derived from a food demand system estimated on the CEX (see 5.2). Standard errors in parentheses are based on
100 block bootstrap replications, clustered by extended family.
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Appendix Table 3: Income Parameter Estimates
Variance of Permanent Shocks Variance of Transitory Shocks
var(uIi,j,t) var(uFi,j,t) % insurable var(eIi,j,t) var(eFi,j,t) % insurable
(idiosyncratic) (family) by family (idiosyncratic) (family) by family
1979-81 0.014 0.014 0.495 0.018 0.009 0.673
(0.006) (0.003) (0.128) (0.010) (0.005) (0.163)
1982 0.015 0.013 0.540 0.026 0.012 0.674
(0.008) (0.003) (0.141) (0.012) (0.005) (0.166)
1983 0.012 0.009 0.556 0.020 0.008 0.710
(0.006) (0.003) (0.148) (0.010) (0.004) (0.138)
1984 0.018 0.016 0.529 0.019 0.002 0.905
(0.006) (0.003) (0.091) (0.010) (0.004) (0.136)
1985 0.031 0.024 0.559 0.024 0.005 0.836
(0.009) (0.003) (0.073) (0.009) (0.004) (0.100)
1986 0.013 0.019 0.410 0.024 0.014 0.639
(0.006) (0.003) (0.130) (0.008) (0.005) (0.072)
1987 0.016 0.011 0.603 0.013 0.007 0.654
(0.007) (0.003) (0.145) (0.007) (0.004) (0.093)
1988 0.023 0.011 0.667 0.018 0.011 0.623
(0.008) (0.003) (0.130) (0.009) (0.005) (0.102)
1989 0.018 0.009 0.675 0.015 0.005 0.734
(0.005) (0.003) (0.103) (0.009) (0.004) (0.152)
1990 0.019 0.012 0.611 0.022 0.012 0.644
(0.006) (0.003) (0.086) (0.013) (0.006) (0.151)
1991 0.022 0.003 0.872 0.022 0.013 0.623
(0.008) (0.003) (0.097) (0.013) (0.005) (0.193)
1992 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.051 0.016 0.761
(0.007) (0.003) (0.358) (0.014) (0.005) (0.089)
1993 0.004 0.008 0.365 0.053 0.022 0.707
(0.012) (0.003) (0.314) (0.017) (0.008) (0.080)
1994-96 0.022 0.013 0.619 0.047 0.028 0.626
(0.013) (0.007) (0.196) (0.011) (0.006) (0.057)
1998-00 0.029 0.010 0.747 0.020 0.022 0.472
(0.010) (0.005) (0.119) (0.010) (0.007) (0.121)
2002 0.024 0.006 0.790 0.031 0.022 0.579
(0.010) (0.004) (0.177) (0.015) (0.008) (0.094)
2004 0.007 0.012 0.375 0.024 0.016 0.598
(0.006) (0.004) (0.217) (0.010) (0.009) (0.091)
2006 0.013 0.010 0.566 0.017 0.017 0.492
(0.003) (0.003) (0.101) (0.008) (0.007) (0.119)
2008-10 0.013 0.004 0.748 0.028 0.024 0.544
(0.004) (0.002) (0.117) (0.010) (0.007) (0.062)
θ (Serial correlation of transitory shock) 0.163 (0.142)
Income measurement error variance 0.015 (0.011)
Note: This table reports year-by-year estimates of the income process where idiosyncratic household and family-
aggregate components are defined as in Section 3.3. Columns (1)-(3) report estimates for permanent shocks and
columns (5)-(7) report estimates for transitory shocks. Columns (3) and (7) report the percent of the total income
shock that is potentially insurable by the extended family. The sample includes “families” in the 1979-2011 PSID,
where we define “families” as a cohabiting couple under 65 and their adult children over 25. Income is defined as
total income net of taxes and family transfers. Standard errors in parentheses are based on 100 block bootstrap
replications, clustered by extended family.
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Appendix Table 4: Moments associated with mismeasuring the group
Group type var(∆ log yi,j,t) var(∆ log yi,j,t) var(∆ log ci,j,t) var(∆ log ci,j,t)
True group var(uF ) + var(uI) var(uF ) δ2Fvar(uF ) + δ2Ivar(uI) δ2Fvar(uF )
Missing member NN−1var(u
F ) + N(N−2)(N−1)2 var(u
I) NN−1var(u
F ) δ2Fvar(uF ) + δ2Ivar(uI) δ2Fvar(uF ) + δ2I 1(N−1)2 var(u
I)
Extra member NN+1var(u
F ) + N2(N+1)(N−1)var(u
I) NN+1var(u
F ) δ2Fvar(uF ) + δ2Ivar(uI) δ2F 1+N
2
(1+N)2 var(u
F ) + δ2I 1(1+N)2 var(u
I)
Wrong member var(uF ) + var(uI) var(uF ) δ2Fvar(uF ) + δ2Ivar(uI) δ2F
(N−1)2+1
N2 var(u
F ) + δ2I 2N2 var(u
I)
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